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In Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc 2008 SCC 61, the Supreme 
Court held, affirming the lower courts, that allegations that Sanofi‟s patent 
for a blood anti-coagulant was invalid for obviousness and lack of novelty 
were unjustified.  In doing so, the Court modified the criteria of anticipation 
and obviousness found in Beloit Canada Ltd v Valmet OY (1986), 8 CPR(3d) 
289 (Fed CA), to align them more closely with European and American 
practice.  The Court found that the lower courts had erred in not recognizing 
that anticipation requires both disclosure and enablement, and that 
obviousness may require an investigation into whether or not it was “more or 
less self-evident” to try the course that led to the invention.  The English 5-
step method of analyzing obviousness was adopted. The decision, while based 
on a pre-1989 patent, seems to apply equally to post-1989 ones.  The paper 
takes the opportunity of discussing other statements in Beloit that have 
sometimes been misunderstood.  It concludes by applauding the lack of 
discussion about the invention‟s commercial success on the issue of 
unobviousness. 
                                                          
* Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto; Emeritus Professor of Intellectual Property & Information Technology Law, 
University of Oxford; Emeritus Fellow, St Peter‟s College, Oxford.   
* This paper is a slightly revised version of one delivered at the Federal Court Judges‟ 
Annual Seminar held in Montreal on 7-8 October 2009.  My thanks to Rothstein J and 






In Apotex Inc v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc, the Supreme 
Court held that allegations that Sanofi‟s patent for the blood anti-
coagulant Plavix® (clopidogrel bilsulphate) was invalid, because the 
invention was old or obvious, were unjustified. Apotex, which had 
made those allegations when seeking a notice of compliance from 
Health Canada to market a generic version of the drug, therefore had 
to wait to  until Sanofi‟s patent expired to market it.    
The trial judge (Shore J) had reached the same result as the 
Supreme Court, and was affirmed in fact and law by the Federal Court 
of Appeal (Noël JA, Richard CJ and Evans JA concurring).1 In 
reaffirming, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment delivered 
by Rothstein J, subtly but significantly tightened the standards of 
novelty and unobviousness that inventions must meet in Canada, 
aligning them more closely with European and American practice.2   
This paper is a comment on this decision. 
 
I 
To be considered old or obvious is not always a bad thing. We 
talk of the good old days, good old wine, even good old academics and 
(I dare say) good old judges; and making things seem obvious is what 
many a lecturer aspires to, though less often realizes. 
Elsewhere, being old or obvious can be a less positive 
attribute. The good old days were not always that good; old wine can 
turn sour, as indeed can old academics. Being obvious is not always 
good either; the speaker who belabours the obvious risks losing his 
audience. So does the one who recycles stuff the audience already 
knows. 
Patent law is categorical on the subject of oldness and 
obviousness: they are vices. If perchance the patent office does grant a 
                                                          
1 Apotex Inc v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc, 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 3 SCR 265, aff‟ing 
2006 FCA 421, 59 CPR (4th) 46, aff‟ing 2005 FC 390, 39 CPR (4th) 202 [Sanofi]. The 
Supreme Court also affirmed on conventional grounds both courts‟ holding that 
Apotex‟s allegation of double patenting was unjustified; this paper omits discussion of 
that aspect. 
2 Decisions already interpreting and applying Sanofi include Apotex Inc v. Pfizer 
Canada Inc, 2009 FCA 8 at22ff  (Noël JA, Létourneau & Blais JJA concurring); 
Ratiopharm Inc v. Pfizer Ltd, 2009 FC 711 at 158ff (Hughes J); Lundbeck Canada Inc 




patent for an old or obvious invention, the grant is void from the start 
and may be struck off the register, on re-examination by the patent 
office or in impeachment proceedings before the federal court. Patent 
law aims to encourage the production of new and different 
technologies and processes for the overall benefit of society and the 
economy: whatever is already known or achievable by anybody 
without much thought or difficulty deserves no monopoly or social 
reward beyond the usual chance to compete in the marketplace. It is 
in the public interest that anyone be entitled to do, make or deal with 
the old or the obvious as and when he or she likes, without hindrance 
or payment. 
By “old”, patent law does not mean “ancient”; it means “not 
new”, something different from what previously existed. The need to 
be “new” was central right from the first patent laws. Venice‟s Law of 
1474 provided for a 10-year grant of monopoly for “any new and 
ingenious device, not previously made in our jurisdiction,” and 
England‟s Statute of Monopolies of 1624 also gave the “true and first 
inventor” of “any manner of new manufactures within the realm” the 
right to a 14-year monopoly.  But even words like “new” need 
defining, and their meaning can change over time. In referring to 
things “not previously made” in Venice, the Venetian statute implied 
that something well known outside the city state could qualify for a 
Venetian patent if it was unknown locally. That was true under the 
English Act of 1624 too: what was old in France could be new in 
England, and the first importer of a new manufacture was treated as 
the “true and first inventor” under English law. The idea was to 
encourage new industry, and the first importer certainly qualified 
there.   
Today, of course, novelty is looked at globally, and first 
importers are no longer considered inventors, nor are they entitled to 
patents. Nor even is the innovator who toils to produce something 
that, unbeknownst to him, has already been sold in Kazakhstan or 
published in some obscure journal in some obscure language. Prior 
sale or publication of the invention anywhere in the world, however 
isolated and inaccessible, is fatal to any later claim of novelty for it in 
other jurisdictions. 
The need for a patentable invention to be unobvious came 
later. The criterion was absent from legislation through the 19th 




until 1989. But it was part of most countries‟ law, including Canada‟s, 
well before then. Judges said that the very idea of invention implied 
inventive ingenuity, without which an advance was obvious and 
undeserving of a monopoly. Patents went to those who thought and 
acted outside the box of obviousness; obvious advances were patent-
free zones.3 
As with novelty, what obviousness meant – beyond “very 
plain” – was not itself obvious. In England, before trying patent cases 
became the monopoly of the chancery judges, juries often decided 
questions of obviousness, and still do in the United States. Quite apart 
from the added unpredictability of jury decisions, what qualifies as 
obvious has varied over time and place as knowledge has expanded, 
and attitudes on monopoly, innovation and international 
competitiveness have fluctuated.  Abraham Lincoln said the patent 
system “added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius”,4 and courts 
sometimes demanded that inventions show some spark of genius 
before calling them unobvious.  
That viewpoint, however, waned as beneficial discoveries 
came less from lone geniuses working in basements than from 
corporate researchers experimenting methodically in modern well-
equipped laboratories. The “patient searcher is as much entitled to the 
benefits of a monopoly as someone who hits upon an invention by 
some lucky chance or an inspiration”, said an English patents judge in 
the 1970s, and the Supreme Court of Canada agreed.5 The basic issue 
may be whether or not the inventor had disclosed something 
“sufficiently inventive to deserve the grant of a monopoly”,6 but what 
qualifies is a question of degree that may strike different minds 
differently. No wonder Learned Hand CJ found the whole concept of 
                                                          
3 Unobviousness is like the criterion of originality in copyright law.  Originality was 
deduced as essential from language in early copyright statutes that referred to 
“authors” and “works”. 
4 A Lincoln, “Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions” (1859), in D Vaver, 
Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law (Routledge, 2006), vol. 3, 36. 
5 American Cyanamid Co v. Berk Pharmaceuticals Ltd, [1976] RPC 231, 257 (Ch), 
Whitford J, cited with approval in Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Halocarbon (Ont) Ltd, 
[1979] 2 SCR 929, 944, Pigeon J [Halocarbon]. 
6 Société Technique de Pulverisation STEP v. Emson Europe Ltd, [1993] RPC 513, 519 
(CA), Hoffmann LJ; Janssen-Ortho Inc v. Novopharm Ltd, 2006 FC 1234 at 110, 





unobviousness elusive: “as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a 
phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts,”7 or as 
Frank J put it more poetically, “the adventures of judges‟ souls among 
inventions”.8 Reviewing the Canadian case law through to the 1950s, 
Harold Fox agreed, concluding that obviousness “in the end is what 
the judges say it is.”9 
 
II 
What was in issue in Apotex v. Sanofi?  Sanofi had a 1985 
patent for a broad class of anti-coagulant compounds. The claims 
covered all versions of the compounds (250,000 or more in all), 
including the racemates and constituent isomers. Sanofi had not tested 
the whole class but its claims extended, as Canadian patent law 
permits, to the genus of compounds with predicted similar properties 
to those it had successfully tested.   
After filing for the patent, Sanofi continued its research into 
improved coagulants.  Some false leads later, a Sanofi chemist was 
asked to try to isolate the isomers of one of the compounds to see how 
they or their derivatives might perform. The research involved using 
known techniques and trial and error, with no guarantee that any 
experiment would likely yield the isomers or any better resulting 
compound. As it turned out, the isomers were able to be isolated and 
the bisulphate salt of one of the isomers (the enantiomer that right-
rotated polarized light) proved a better and less toxic anti-coagulant 
than the rest of the patented compounds, including the other mirror-
                                                          
7 Harries v. Air King Products Co (1950), 183 F 2d 158 at 162 (2d Cir). 
8 Picard v. United Aircraft (1942), 53 USPQ 563, 569 (2d Cir) concurring, cert den 317 
US 651 (1942), cited at first instance in Halocarbon case n 5 above (1974), 15 CPR(2d) 
105, 112 (Fed TD, Collier J), affd by the SCC, n 5 above. The full quotation reads:  
“Invention,” for patent purposes, has been difficult to define. Efforts to cage the 
concept in words have proved almost as unsuccessful as attempts verbally to imprison 
the concept “beautiful.” Indeed, when one reads most discussions of “invention,” one 
recalls Kipling‟s, “It‟s pretty, but is it Art?” and the aphorism that there is no sense in 
disputes about matters of taste.  Anatole France once said that literary criticism is the 
adventure of the critic‟s soul among masterpieces. To the casual observer, judicial 
patent decisions are the adventures of judges‟ souls among inventions. For a decision 
as to whether or not a thing is an invention is a “value” judgment… 
9 H G Fox, “Copyright and Patent Protection: A Study in Contrasts” (1957), 12 U.T.L.J. 




image isomer and the combined racemate from which the successful 
isomer was isolated. 
In 1988, Sanofi filed for a patent on the isomer in its various 
forms, including clopidogrel bisulphate, the salt form of the effective 
ingredient of what became Plavix®.  It was this patent,10 eventually 
granted in 1995, that Apotex challenged. Apotex said the isomer and 
its salt were disclosed in Sanofi‟s 1985 patent and were therefore not 
new; or, at least, making that isomer or its salt was obvious, given 
what the 1985 patent revealed and what ordinary pharmachemists 
working in the field would have done or surmised. Apotex also 
challenged the whole idea that one can get a fresh patent for a better 
singleton selected from an undifferentiated class. The technological 
equivalent of picking the class‟s gold medallist before the exams are 
sat and marked was, according to Apotex, not something the patent 
law was meant to cover or encourage. 
Apotex‟s arguments failed before Shore J and the Federal 
Court of Appeal on conventional grounds.  Both courts relied largely 
on language in a 1986 decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, Beloit 
Canada Ltd v. Valmet OY,11 which was then the “landmark decision 
[that] defined” both anticipation and obviousness.12 The courts noted 
that selection patents in the chemical field had long been upheld in 
Canadian law, and with them the concept that an item selected from a 
patented class that was shown to work better or differently from its 
classmates could be considered new. They agreed that Sanofi‟s first 
patent included claims on the isomer that was the focus of Sanofi‟s 
later patent; but simply being claimed as part of an undifferentiated 
group of compounds did not disclose the isomer as something 
different from, and better than, the mass. Being one individual in the 
crowd at a rugby match does not disclose this attender to the world 
unless the television camera happens to alight on him and broadcast 
                                                          
10 The use of chiral chemistry to patent isomers extracted from an earlier patented 
general compound is a popular strategy among pharmaceutical companies “to develop 
replacements for the pharmaceuticals which are about to lose their patent protection”: 
B. Domeij, Pharmaceutical Patents in Europe (2000), 149.  Sanofi filed similar patents 
worldwide.  Its US patent was upheld (Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc (2008), 550 F 
3d 1075 (Fed Cir), aff‟ing 492 F Supp 353 (SDNY 2007)), but its Australian patent was 
not (Apotex Pty Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis,[2008] FCA 1194).  The Supreme Court of 
Canada mentioned neither case in its Sanofi judgment. 
11 Beloit Canada Ltd v. Valmet OY (1986), 8 CPR (3d) 289 (Hugessen JA) [Beloit]. 




his image. More specifically, nothing in the first patent taught the 
skilled reader “in every case and without possibility of error” to 
produce the second isomer, nor were its special properties mentioned; 
therefore the isomer had not been anticipated by the prior patent.   
The obviousness argument was rejected because isolating the 
isomer was not an obvious step to take in the quest for a better 
coagulant, in light of what the prior patent and the common general 
knowledge available to the ordinary skilled pharmachemist. 
The Supreme Court dismissed Apotex‟s appeal, but changed 
previous understandings of the law of novelty and unobviousness as 
expressed in Beloit. It made the following points: 
1.  It reaffirmed that the Canadian law of patents was 
statutory: there is no common law of patents.13 
2.  It confirmed that the grant of selection patents was 
consistent with the Patent Act and acceptable in principle. The 
criteria applied in Commonwealth (and until recently British) courts 
were helpful guides.14 Although chemical inventions were the main 
candidates, other inventions could also qualify.15  Whether the first 
patent was held by the second patentee or a third party did not 
matter.16 
3.  To find that an invention was anticipated by the prior art 
and so was already “known or used” or “described” in a prior patent or 
publication,17 the Supreme Court confirmed that the prior art not only 
had to: (a) disclose the invention, but also – and this was novel – (b) 
enable the skilled worker to produce it.   
4. Under requirement (a), the disclosure must give directions 
that, inevitably, would produce the claimed invention, or must for all 
                                                          
13 Supra note 1at 12, citing Comm‟r of Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst AG, [1964] SCR 
49, 57, as well as recent House of Lords authority 
14 Supra note 1 at 9 & 19, calling Maugham J‟s decision in Re I G Farbenindustrie AG‟s 
Patents (1930), 47 RPC 289 (Ch)  the “locus classicus”.; similarly under the Patents 
Act 1977 (UK): Selection patents are analysed differently in the UK and EU, which no 
longer follows the I G Farbenindustrie case: Dr Reddy‟s Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli 
Lilly & Co Ltd, [2009] EWCA Civ 1362. 
15 Supra note 1 at 99. 
16 Ibid at 98. 
17 Patent Act, s.27(1) (pre-1989).  Cf present Patent Act, s 28.2(1)(b), applicable to 
post-1989 patents: subject-matter that is  “disclosed...in such a manner” that it 




practical purposes be equal to that in the patent.18 If the skilled 
worker can discover the invention only after undertaking 
experiments, it is not disclosed. Rothstein J cited an 1862 English case, 
Hill v. Evans,19 that continued as “unquestionable authority” in the 
UK and that he plainly considered equally authoritative in Canada. 
The passage in question, which Rothstein J did not cite at length, 
includes the following: 
 
[K]nowledge, and the means of obtaining knowledge, are 
[not] the same. There is a great difference between them. 
To carry me to the place at which I wish to arrive is very 
different from merely putting me on the road that leads to 
it. There may be a latent truth in the words of a former 
writer, not known even to the writer himself; and it would 
be unreasonable to say that there is no merit in discovering 
and unfolding it to the world.20 
 
That was the position in Sanofi. The isomer was certainly 
referred to and included within the claims in the first patent, but its 
special advantages were nowhere mentioned because they were then 
unknown. The lower courts rightly rejected the anticipation attack on 
this ground. 
5.  Under requirement (b) – enablement – the disclosure must 
contain enough information to allow the later invention to be 
performed without undue burden. Routine trial and error that is not 
“prolonged or arduous” is acceptable.21 Just disclosing the theoretical 
formula of a compound may not disclose the compound itself unless 
the compound has actually been prepared or the skilled worker would 
know, from the given directions or his ordinary knowledge, how to go 
about making it.22 On this theory, a disclosure may be a prior 
publication even though wrong directions on how to work the 
                                                          
18 Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc, [2000] 2 SCR 1024 at 25-27,  Binnie J; Reeves 
Brothers Inc v. Toronto Quilting & Embroidery Ltd (1978), 43 CPR (2d) 145, 157 (Fed 
TD) , Gibson J. 
19 (1862), 4 De G F & J 288. 
20 Ibid at 301-2, by Westbury LC; approved in Synthon BV v. Smithkline Beecham 
plc, [2005] UKHL 59 at 20, Hoffmann L [Synthon]. 
21 Supra note 1 at 37, #3. 
22 Beecham Group Ltd's New Zealand (Amoxycillin) App‟n, [1982] FSR 181 (NZCA); 




invention are given, if the skilled worker would easily detect and 
correct the mistake by routine trial and error.23 
Rothstein J said the lower courts had overlooked this aspect of 
anticipation, which he took from recent House of Lords authority24 
and which is of long standing in the US.25 The error was nonetheless 
harmless because the anticipation attack had already failed under 
requirement (a). He indicated however, obiter, that there was 
probably no enablement, given Shore J‟s findings under (a) that it had 
taken the inventor 6 months of trial and error to isolate the isomer: 
this effort was probably an “undue burden”.26 
6.   The Court concluded that the lower courts had rightly, as 
far as they went, found that the invention was unobvious, but had 
wrongly not considered whether or not it was “obvious to try” to 
isolate the isomer.  Prior Canadian caselaw categorically rejecting the 
“obvious to try” test27 was inconsistent with modern UK and US 
authority and is now implicitly overruled. In fields where 
experimentation was common, it may be appropriate to ask whether 
or not it was “more or less self-evident” to try the course that led to 
the invention.28 All the relevant facts must be considered, including 
such things as the history of the invention, the motive to find a 
solution to a known problem, and the number and extent of avenues 
of research.29 
7.  Without saying such an approach was compulsory, the 
Supreme Court thought the structured approach to analyzing 
obviousness that English courts had pioneered and refined could 
usefully be adopted in Canada, namely by following these five steps: 
 First, identify the notional person skilled in the art to whom the 
claim is addressed at the priority date. 
 Second, identify the common general knowledge of that person.  
                                                          
23 Supra note 1 at 37, #4; Synthon, supra note 20, at 20. 
24 Viz., Synthon, ibid. 
25 Seymour v. Osborne (1870), 78 US 516. 
26 Supra note 1 at 47-48. 
27 Eg, Bayer AG v. Apotex Inc (1995), 60 CPR (3d) 58, 77-82 (Ont GD), Lederman J, 
aff‟d (1998), 82 CPR (3d) 526 (Ont CA), leave to appeal denied [1998] SCCA No 563 
[Bayer]. 
28 Supra note 1 at 69. 




 Third, construe the claim and identify its inventive concept.  
 Fourth, identify the differences between the claimed invention 
and the state of the art. 
 Fifth, set aside any knowledge of the claimed invention, and 
decide whether those differences involve steps that would have 
been very plain to the skilled person, or would require some 
invention.30  
Having gone through the first four steps, Rothstein J thought 
it would not have been obvious for the skilled pharmachemist to try 
the course that led to the isolation of the claimed isomer. It was not 
self-evident: (a) which of the thousands of compounds in the 1985 
patent should be selected for further research; (b) that the research 
should comprise isolating the isomers of the racemate of that 
compound; and (c) that the claimed isomer would be better and less 
toxic than the other isomer or the racemate in which it was found. 
The Court was impressed by the fact that Sanofi chemists, who had at 
least the skill of the average pharmachemist in the field (and probably 
a lot more), had spent some years and millions of dollars taking the 
racemate through to clinical trials without thinking to isolate the 
isomer and develop its bisulphate salt. If they had not thought it 
obvious to try that course, it would not have been obvious to the 
notional skilled pharmachemist.31 
 
III 
The following points are among those suggested by the Sanofi 
opinion: 
1.  The law on unobviousness as stated by the Court applies 
equally to pre-1989 and post-1989 patents.32 Rothstein J noted that he 
was applying judge-made law on obviousness to the Sanofi pre-1989 
patent but, in doing so, he drew on much English case law under the 
Patents Act 1977 (UK).  The 1977 Act‟s provisions on obviousness are 
very close to those of the Canadian post-1989 Act;33 so English case 
                                                          
30 Ibid. at 67, adopting the approach in Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ 
588 at 23. 
31 Ibid at 92. 
32 Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6 at 109. 
33 Under Patents Act 1977 (UK), ss 3 and 2(2), an invention must not be “obvious to a 




law will be equally useful guidance where no Canadian authority is on 
point. The same holds broadly true for the law of novelty on pre-1989 
and post-1989 patents. 
2.  Rothstein J approved both UK and US authority that 
deplored the use of formulaic language and “rigid rules” on questions 
of obviousness.34  His judgment itself should therefore not be read as 
substituting a new set of formulae in place of Beloit‟s. He plainly 
regarded obviousness as a question involving “a value judgment which 
takes into account a variety of factors” some “purely technical, others 
not”.35 His decision highlights some of the factors and the sort of 
evidence that will help demonstrate their presence, and echoes the 
approach already taken in decisions of the federal court.36   
3.  Beloit has been battered as an authority on both 
anticipation and obviousness and deserves a couple of extra jabs for 
other statements on obviousness that it makes and that have a habit of 
reappearing.37 The dicta are: (a) “[e]very invention is obvious after it 
has been made, and to no one more so than an expert in the field,” 
and (b) obviousness is “a very difficult test to satisfy.”38 
Those statements, while no doubt appropriate to the facts of 
Beloit, should not be pressed to imply more than they say. The first, 
that “[e]very invention is obvious after it has been made, and to no 
one more so than an expert in the field”, fairly emphasizes the need 
for tribunals to stand in the position of the ordinary skilled worker at 
the priority date, knowing only what he knew then, and to judge 
obviousness without hindsight. But it is sometimes pushed to imply, 
                                                                                                                                  
anywhere in any way before the invention‟s priority date.  For post-1989 Canadian 
patents, s 28.3(1)(b) of the Canadian Patent Act requires the “subject-matter defined 
by a claim” [i.e., the invention] not to “have been obvious on the claim date to a 
person skilled in the art or science to which it pertains, having regard to information 
disclosed before the claim date ... in such a manner that the information became 
available to the public” anywhere. 
34 Supra note 1 at 61 & 63. 
35 Nichia Corp v. Argos Ltd, [2007] EWCA Civ 741 at 21-22, Jacob LJ (dissenting on 
other grounds). 
36 Eg, Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6 at 113, listing factors that the FCA on appeal 
called “helpful to guide the required factual inquiry, and as a framework for the 
factual analysis that must be undertaken” (at 25). 
37 It may be significant that Rothstein J mentioned neither statement in his 
comprehensive opinion. 




wrongly, that most applications are for unobvious inventions or that 
most challenged patents are unobvious. No reliable data exist on 
either of these points. 
The second comment – obviousness, “a very difficult test to 
satisfy” – may be useful as a warning not to set the bar too high before 
inventions may qualify as patentable, but it should not be taken to 
mean that obviousness is always very difficult to establish. How 
difficult it is to prove anything always depends on the facts of the 
case. Some inventions will withstand all obviousness attacks; to judge 
and expert alike, they may seem miraculous when first patented, and 
may seem miraculous even now. Others are immediately exposed 
once a piece of prior art is produced. Yet others become obvious only 
gradually as the evidence and arguments unfold.  What looked clever 
to a patent office examiner may later look trite to a court with fuller 
material before it. Rothstein J‟s statements are in line with this view. 
He said that courts should approach the “obvious to try” test 
“cautiously”: it was not “a panacea for alleged infringers”, just one 
factor to consider.39 But he made it equally clear that the usual balance 
of probability standard of proof applies,40 as it does to all civil cases.41 
4.  In the Harvard Mouse case, in arguing for the patentability 
of genetically modified animals, Binnie J said: “The mobility of capital 
and technology makes it desirable that comparable jurisdictions with 
comparable intellectual property legislation arrive (to the extent 
permitted by the specifics of their own laws) at similar legal results”.42 
Sanofi continues the harmonization trend through its reliance on 
modern UK and US precedents over earlier Canadian caselaw that had 
got stuck in a rut. Nothing in the Patent Act suggests that anticipation 
or obviousness should be any harder or easier to find in Canada than 
in any other major developed country. So cases where a Canadian 
patent on a foreign invention is held unobvious after a court abroad 
                                                          
39 Supra note 1 at 64. 
40 Ibid. at 66. 
41 FH v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at 40 & 45, Rothstein J: “I think it is time to say, 
once and for all in Canada, that there is only one civil standard of proof at common 
law and that is proof on a balance of probabilities. ... I think it is inappropriate to say 
that there are legally recognized different levels of scrutiny of the evidence 
depending upon the seriousness of the case.  There is only one legal rule and that is 
that in all cases, evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge.” 





rules the corresponding patent obvious43 should become marginally 
rarer now. Conflicting decisions will of course never be entirely 
eliminated for national laws vary subtly, judges view and weigh facts 
differently, and evidence may differ from one jurisdiction to 
another.44 
5.  The Court left open the question of when the “obvious to 
try” test will be appropriate to apply. Much will depend on common 
practice in the art to which the invention belongs: “[i]n areas of 
endeavour where advances are often won by experimentation, an 
„obvious to try‟ test might be appropriate.”45 Presumably the expert 
evidence will indicate whether a particular field of technology 
qualifies as an area where the skilled worker is prone to search for 
improvements through experimenting. 
6.  In asking what courses are obvious to try, Rothstein J 
suggested putting the following questions: 
(1)  Is it more or less self-evident that what is being 
tried ought to work? Are there a finite number of identified 
predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art? 
(2)  What is the extent, nature and amount of effort 
required to achieve the invention? Are routine trials carried 
out or is the experimentation prolonged and arduous, such 
that the trials would not be considered routine? 
(3)  Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find 
the solution the patent addresses?46 
He added that “a possibility of finding the invention is not 
enough.”47  Jacob LJ from the Court of Appeal in an English case 
questioned: “Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried 
ought to work?”48 Jacob LJ himself had equated this formula with 
options that have “at least a fair expectation of success,”49 although the 
                                                          
43 The leading example is from Bayer, supra note 27, where a Canadian patent for a 
German invention was found valid over a prior contrary ruling in Britain on the 
corresponding UK patent. 
44 Sanofi is itself an example of the phenomenon, if the Australian decision to 
invalidate the patent in Apotex Pty Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis, supra note10, stands. 
45 Supra note 1 at 68. 
46 Ibid. at 69. 
47 Ibid. at 85. 
48 Saint-Gobain PAM SA v. Fusion Provida Ltd, [2005] EWCA Civ 177 at 35. 




House of Lords later qualified the adjective “fair” by saying: “How 
much of an expectation would be needed depend[s] upon the 
particular facts of the case.”50   
One hopes Canadian courts will avoid the trap that English 
courts seem close to falling into again: using verbal formulae apt for 
one case as apt for all. Just as Beloit provided no “statutory 
prescription” on obviousness,51 nor does English caselaw, nor does 
Sanofi itself.  Since 1989, obviousness is a statutory criterion in 
Canada, and the court ultimately must construe its meaning in the 
light of the history and purpose of the Patent Act as a whole,52 rather 
than finding apt universal paraphrases for the word.   
The point was usefully made in the Federal Court of Appeal 
the year before the Supreme Court‟s decision in Sanofi. Sharlow JA for 
the court agreed with the first instance judge (Hughes J) that “catch 
phrases ... from the jurisprudence” were “not to be treated as though 
they are rules of law.”  Any list of factors, however useful, is: 
 
not a list of legal rules to be slavishly followed; nor is it 
an exhaustive list of the relevant factors. The task of the 
trial judge in each case is to determine, on the basis of the 
evidence, sound judgment and reason, the weight (if any) to 
be given to the listed factors and any additional factors that 
may be presented.”53  
 
                                                          
50 Conor Medsystems Inc v. Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc, [2008] UKHL 49 at 42, 
Hoffmann L.   In Intervet UK Ltd v Merial, [2010] EWHC 294 at [241] (Pat Ct) 
Arnold J interpreted this to mean whether the skilled team “would have had a 
reasonable expectation of success and ... would have been likely to succeed.” 
51 Supra note 1 at 61. 
52 Cf Binnie J in Harvard Mouse, supra note 42 at 11:  
I accept, as does my colleague [Bastarache J], that the proper approach to 
interpretation of this statute is to read the words “in their entire context and 
in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of 
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: E. A. 
Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87. .. The intent that 
can properly be attributed to Parliament, based on the language it used and 
the context of patent legislation generally, is that it considered it to be in the 
public interest to encourage new and useful inventions without knowing 
what such inventions would turn out to be and to that end inventors who 
disclosed their work should be rewarded for their ingenuity. 




7.  On obviousness, the Sanofi judgments are remarkable by 
what is not mentioned: namely, the commercial success of Plavix® as 
a factor favouring unobviousness. Presumably, as in the companion 
US litigation,54 the parties presented no evidence on the point.   
One may hope, but, alas, with no conviction, that this conduct 
signals a trend against the use of this element as a relevant factor.55 In 
NOC cases, reliance on it is anyway superfluous: why else would a 
generic company want to copy a medicine unless it was commercially 
successful? The same logic also applies to infringement litigation: a 
patentee would only very rarely spend money enforcing its rights 
unless the patent was for a winner. To allow commercial success to 
diminish an obviousness defence may deter the raising of legitimate 
cases where the attack is warranted on the technical evidence. 
Giving weight to commercial success seems to reflect a natural 
desire to reward merit and deter free-riders. It is patent law‟s 
counterpart to copyright law‟s vacuous “rough practical test” that 
what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.56 In a 
competitive market, what sells well may be prima facie worth 
protecting from the seller‟s viewpoint. In public policy terms, it 
should prima facie be worth leaving open to competition. Someone 
has to be first to market with a winner: being that someone does not 
make the outcome an invention, for a product may be new and 
attractive, yet obvious. 
Commercial success nonetheless crops up constantly as a 
reason to hold a patent unobvious or otherwise valid, especially in 
borderline cases.57  In Canadian litigation, it tends to surface too early 
and effectively shapes the eventual trial. Once a defendant pleads 
unobviousness, the parties inevitably reveal during pre-trial discovery 
how their products are faring on the market.58 At trial, each side feels 
                                                          
54 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc, supra note 10at 392. 
55 See, eg Janssen-Ortho, supra note 6 at 113 & 114 #7, on appeal FCA at 25, #7. 
56 University of London Press Ltd v. University Tutorial Press Ltd, [1916] 2 Ch 601, 
610 (Peterson J), discredited as a “misleading ... rhetorical device” in Baigent v. 
Random House Group Ltd, [2007] EWCA Civ 247 at [97], Lloyd LJ. 
57 Haberman v. Jackel Inc, [1999] FSR 683 (Pat Ct, Laddie J), where the evidence 
tipped a close case of a very simple advance – a baby‟s spill-proof training cup – 
towards a finding of validity and infringement. 
58 Dimplex North America Ltd v. CFM Majestic Inc (2003), 28 CPR (4th) 266 (Fed TD, 
Henaghan J).  At trial, the court held that the commercial success of both parties‟ 




it has to make something of the commercial success or failure of the 
products or processes, or risk adverse comment.   
By contrast, current British practice disfavours pre-trial 
disclosure of commercial success, and the evidence may altogether be 
excluded at trial if it would prove little.59 A leading British case states 
that, if admitted, the evidence “must be kept firmly in place”; its 
weight “will vary from case to case”; it “must not be permitted, by 
reason of its volume and complexity, to obscure the fact that it is no 
more than an aid in assessing the primary evidence.”60 Yet still the 
idea keeps popping up. Even judges who avoid citing commercial 
success as a formal reason to support unobviousness nevertheless 
cannot seem to avoid mentioning it elsewhere as an implicit reason 
for upholding a patent.61 
One is left with the uncomfortable feeling that the factor is, at 
best, a costly distraction or, at worst, a short-cut to the wrong 
destination.62 One can only applaud the parties‟ decision in Sanofi not 
to raise it. 
 
                                                          
59 Supra note 35 at 6; Alan Nuttall Ltd v. Fri-Jado UK Ltd, [2008] EWHC 1311 at 5-6 
(Pat Ct),(Prescott QC). 
60 Mölnlycke AB v. Proctor & Gamble Ltd, [1994] RPC 49, 112 (CA), (Nicholls VC). 
61 Eg, Supra note 50 at 12. 
62 Cf Supra note 35, questioning whether discovery of an inventor‟s notes and 
experiments was proportionate to the stakes involved in the case. 
